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Prevention and Protection Interventions for Stateless Non-Refugee
and Force Displaced Children
Tanya Herring
Bangor University, Wales
This article advances a general theory of law and justice that would expand the Palermo
Trafficking and Smuggling Protocols to a wider application in human rights jurisprudence. The
aim of the research reported here is to close the gaps in member-state policy and scholarship
that addresses prevention measures and protection mechanisms for forcibly displaced children
seeking self-determination in states that have not ratified the UN Convention on Refugees and
the UN Conventions on Statelessness. The research is based on the premise that a stateless
nonrefugee status constructs an extremely vulnerable state for children during forced migration
and when they are living in camps or detention centers. It focuses on the Rohingya and Lumad
children in targeted regions of Southeast Asia in comparison with Roma children in Eastern
Europe.
The study outcomes are structured to mitigate the exploitation of targeted vulnerable and
highly vulnerable populations, regardless of nationality or citizenry. An innovative new model,
the International Law’s Response to Major Incidents of Forced Displacement (IL-R2/MIFD), is
offered as the descriptor to the components of decision making, structures of pleadings, and
applicable international laws to circumvent particular scenarios of human trafficking, and
multiple forms of exploitation occurring as a result of massive forced displacement situations
across the globe.
______________________________________________________________________________
“We are facing the biggest refugee and displacement crisis of our time. Above all, this is not just
a crisis of numbers; it is also a crisis of solidarity.”
——Ban Ki-Moon, Secretary-General of the United Nations, 2015
“International law protects the right of every child to acquire a nationality. Yet, childhood
statelessness pervades all regions of the world. At least a third of the 15 million people who face
life without a nationality today are children, and, every ten minutes, another child is born
stateless.”
——World’s Stateless Report, 2017

Self-determination is embodied in many international instruments, including the United Nations
Charter articles 1 and 55 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, article 1, and it is
affirmed in the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1514 (1960) that states, “All
peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they may freely determine
Tanya Herring, Ph.D., D.Mgt., is a candidate for a Ph.D. in law with a focus on international criminal law and
international human rights at Bangor University, Wales; a research fellow with International Communities
Organization, London; and a postdoctorate fellow with Wales Observatory on Human Rights of Children and Young
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their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”
Similarly, article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights asserts, “Everyone has the
right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his
religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private,
to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.” Yet,
disagreement and controversy remain about a clear definition of “peoples” and how selfdetermination is viewed in a global society. The horrific 2015–2016 mass exodus of the
Rohingya from Myanmar and the subsequent refugee crisis indicate that the right to exercise
self-determination is not afforded to the stateless.1 Instead, the Rohingya and similarly situated
displaced children and their families in Southeast Asia, who meet the UN definition of
marginalized and disadvantaged groups, are fleeing religious-discrimination-based conflict and
the denial of peaceful self-determination.2 Caught up in forced migration, on both land and sea,
and living in inhumane conditions in detention centers and refugee encampments, children and
other vulnerable persons too frequently fall prey to multiple forms of human trafficking.3 The
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in 2018 acknowledged that many
refugees, asylum-seekers, stateless people, and migrants consistently get involved in
exploitation, abuse, and violence during their migration journeys, during which countless have
lost their lives on land and in crowded unseaworthy vessels.4 Children who are survivors of
horrific, life-threatening land and sea journeys often cite as their driving force the basic elements
of the UN principle on self-determination. That principle is stated in the UN Charter as one of
the purposes of the United Nations:
To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal
rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to
strengthen universal peace. (chap. 1, art. 1(2)).
The denial of citizenship, among other human rights, has become an international concern in
Southeast Asia, particularly in the focal states of this study—Bangladesh, Myanmar, Malaysia,
and Thailand—which are not member states to the 1951 Refugee Convention, the 1954
Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness,5 or the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees6 and have no “duediligence”7 obligation to these human rights treaties.8 Though the United Nations Convention on
the Rights of the Child and many of its protocols have been ratified by more countries than has
any other convention globally, many questions remain about how the convention is implemented
and enforced for children without citizenship. 9 As a result, many uncertainties arise over
verifying whether the person is a child, defined by article 1 of the convention as a person under
eighteen years of age. Additionally, the state obligations for a human rights treaty fall under the
due diligence standard with minimum repercussions in regions without a Human Rights Court.10
Thus, the nonmember states of the Refugee and Statelessness Conventions do not recognize
persons as refugees or as stateless; nor do they provide any of the internationally recognized
supports set forth in these international derived statuses. For example, the introductory note of
the 1954 Convention on Statelessness announces that “the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees has been mandated to assist stateless refugees since it was
established on 1 January 1951.” Moreover, since the entry into force of the 1954 and 1961
Conventions on Statelessness, the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme
has adopted a succession of General Assembly resolutions and conclusions. These resolutions
and conclusions reiterate that UNHCR has a leadership role in assisting “non-refugee stateless
2
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persons as a distinct population of persons of concern.”11 Yet, UNHCR’s leadership role is
hampered when states are not parties to the conventions on refugees and statelessness.

Method and Central Research Question
For this study, the indigenous groups are employed as research exemplars in the investigation,
because the critical case has the capacity to yield what M. Q. Patton describes as “the greatest
impacts on the development of knowledge.”12 The Rohingya crisis presents a critical case that
can be generalized, in keeping with the statement, “If it happens there, it will happen anywhere”
or, vice versa, “If it doesn’t happen there, it won’t happen anywhere.”13 That is, if the proposed
legal framework in Southeast Asia works with the Rohingya, it should work in other similar
geographical areas and populations, and thus, it can be applied in other like situations.
The critical-case study methodology permits empirical analytic generalization of
international remedies. Bent Flyvbjerg’s well-respected work suppports the application of a
critical case as “a case with strategic importance to the general problem.”14 Following the
guidance and protocol of Flyvbjerg and other seminal case-study researchers, this case study
maintains an internal database that allows the investigator to develop an audit trail of the body of
evidence from data collection, through analysis, to final conclusions. Accordingly, the reader
should be able to connect the conclusions presented in this case study and research protocols to
the underlying analyses, the supporting strands of evidence, and the central research question:
Can the Palermo Trafficking and Smuggling Protocols serve as a conduit to legal empowerment
and peaceful self-determination?15
Case-study methodology is a social science discipline.16 This critical-case study design is
used to clarify how laws are understood, how laws are subverted, and how frameworks can be
modified to address gaps in the law. The presumption is that the cause, forced induced migration,
and the effect, increased smuggling and trafficking of persons, can be mitigated or decreased
with an application of a state-obliged legal framework using these two primary international
instruments in tandem.

Background
The Rohingya and Lumad people of Southeast Asia are widely characterized in the literature as
disadvantaged and highly marginalized in their respective regions. Their demographic
characteristics align with those of other similarly situated groups in other regions of the world.
The Rohingya, Lumad, and Roma are each considered impoverished. Historically, they share
certain characteristics, including statelessness, frequent forced displacement, and discrimination.
Their multiple movements exhibit the characteristics of disaster-induced migration.
For centuries, the Rohingya have been referenced as the “boat people” because of their
consistent travels on the seas and their work as laborers in the fishing industry.17 Similarly, the
derogatory terms “gypsies,” “vagabonds,” and “tinkers” are associated with the Roma and refer
to their frequent travel modes and irregular employment.18 The Lumad are also a mobile group.
According to archeological records, the Lumad are a Moro (ethnic Muslim) who are also referred
to as “sea gypsies” and have been subjected to religion-based discriminatory violence. The
Lumads’ disputes over land and their claims to indigenous self-determination in the Philippines,
which occurred around the same time as the Rohingya crisis of 2016, have led to massive
protests.19 Each of these nomadic lifestyles has rendered a significant number of the Rohingya,
Roma, and Lumad societies as uneducated, impoverished, and highly vulnerable.20
3
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Self-Determination
Self-determination became the steering determinant following World War II and the
reconstruction of Europe. A state is noted to have “the right of self-determination in the sense of
having the right to choose freely its political, economic, social, and cultural systems” and to have
“the right of a people to constitute itself in a state or otherwise freely determine the form of its
association within a state.”21 This sociolegal research provides a critical discourse on the
international prevention measures and protection mechanisms for populations seeking selfdetermination that have become forced displaced as a cause of statelessness or as a consequence
of statelessness.22 This research focuses on stateless nonrefugees, who, according to the 1954
Convention on Statelessness, possess “profound vulnerability.” The convention refers to the
“practical problems they face in their everyday lives” despite a state’s requirement to provide
them with “identity papers and travel documents,” among other resources.23 Without essential
papers or documentation of identity, the stateless are subject to multiple forms of denial of access
to justice, education, and services. For children, gaps in identification are the root cause of high
vulnerability to exploitation and life-long challenges.24
Marginalized Populations
The migration of human beings, ongoing for centuries, remains a critical method for overcoming
hardship and deprivation. But for marginalized populations, forced migration has evolved as a
necessity for survival. Reports from the Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion point out that not
all stateless persons are refugees and not all refugees are stateless, though, inevitably, the two
groups overlap. According to the Institute on Statelessness and UNHCR, for the purposes of
international law, a person can be both a stateless person and a refugee.25
History has shown that the disenfranchised suffer greatly and primarily live external to the
ambit of law, where their extreme poverty is directly linked to the cause and consequence of
gaps in effective legal rights. In times of conflict, regardless of domestic or international status,
the disadvantaged and vulnerable are the unfortunate recipients of callous human rights
violations that can be likened to grave breaches—a criminal level traditionally reserved for
conflicts of war.
For many years, women and children have been the focus of international protections
because of their high degree of vulnerability to exploitation, especially sexual. Yet, current
research has expanded the realm of vulnerability to include the adolescent male child with a high
degree of vulnerability; also, the vulnerability of an adult woman is in a separate category from
that of the girl child.26 Vulnerability, factors affecting vulnerability, and focused interventions
for stateless, refugee, and forced displaced children is a recurring and primary theme of this
study. Even now, many cultures continue to view women and children as property to be abused,
exploited, bartered, sold, or married, regardless of age. Within the context of nationality,
marriage and the loss of a marriage are connected to citizenship for woman and children. In
some instances, a married man dies, the adverse impact of lost nationality affects the wife and
children from the marriage.27
Statelessness
The extent of statelessness has increased as migration has increased exponentially over the past
several years. Thus, figures presented in this study that quantify statelessness and others studies
4

New England Journal of Public Policy
like it are estimates or date-based snapshots. At best, the figures are structured to convey the
degree of severity for the purposes of research, policy making, or other decision-making
processes. UNHCR records the increases in the numbers of stateless people, noting, for example,
that a new record of 42.5 million forcibly displaced people globally was set in 2011.28 Though
these figures are already old, reports from UNHCR suggest that these numbers have risen
sharply each year, escalating to “45.2 million in 2012 to 51.2 million in 2013 and 59.5 million in
2014.” This is an increase of more than 50 percent in five years. Statistically, future increases are
likely to be similar. Because gender discrimination in nationality laws is often region specific,
the figures are representative of how gender policies are a significant causative factor. Additional
studies from UNHCR record absolute numbers, revealing that statelessness is affecting more
people in the geographical regions of Asia and the Pacific than in any other location of the
world.29 In Asia, for 2015, UNHCR reported an approximate total of 1,423,000 persons under
statelessness. Statelessness and the accompanying plight have no boundaries. In contrast, reports
for the Americas record the lowest number of stateless persons, with figures slightly above
200,000. Experts assert that the Americas practice the strategies and advantages of a jus soli
approach to nationality, conferring nationality at birth on all children born within the territory,
and this action is a significant factor in the prevention of next-generation statelessness.30
Though the Americas, specifically the United States, can be credited with exercising
strategies that reduce statelessness, other research shows that these actions were outcomes of
massive losses of missing and exploited children and the lack of a systematic approach. For
example, the legislation for missing and exploited children was not placed into US national law
until 1984 under President Ronald Reagan.31 Records from hearings before the House
Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary reveal that
more than five hundred thousand unidentified children were in morgues and coroner’s offices
across the nation with wide speculation that many were victims of some form of exploitation.32 It
took the United States thirty-two years to develop a reporting system for missing and exploited
children, while there was an efficient reporting system in place for cars, weapons, and even
missing agricultural animals. Subsequently, a question can arise about how many of these
children were seeking self-determination and are stateless, trafficked, exploited, and now
missing. More important, the situation in the United States reveals that developing measures to
prevent and protect children is an evolving global issue, even for developed countries.
By comparison, statelessness is more comprehensively mapped in Europe than in any other
region. Statistical reporting on statelessness has been achieved in forty out of the fifty countries
that fall within the scope of UNHCR’s Europe regional bureau. The cumulative report outcomes
from UNHCR indicate that an average of 670,828, and an estimated 85 percent are located in
four countries: Latvia, the Russian Federation, Estonia, and Ukraine. Assumptions have been
made that this accumulation is a product of the dissolution of the Soviet Union.33
Examples can also be found in other regions. In the mid-1980s, several thousand West
Papuans fled from the Indonesian part of New Guinea Island, across the border into Papua New
Guinea, to escape political turmoil. Many remain in the area to this day. Their long-term absence
from Indonesia led to the loss of their Indonesian citizenship under the operation of the
nationality law, but most have not been able to naturalize as Papuan citizens because they do not
meet the criteria or cannot pay the fee. Similarly, Western Sahara is a disputed territory in the
Middle East and North Africa, flanked by Morocco, Algeria, and Mauritania.34 The International
Court of Justice ruled in 1975 that the residents of this territory must be allowed to participate in
a referendum on the question of self-determination.35 Subsequently, Morocco assumed control of
5
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the territory without a referendum. Those Western Saharans, or Sahrawi, who did not want to be
subject to Moroccan control were forced to flee the territory and thus became further victims of
forced displacement. Records show that the majority of the group elected to live in refugee
camps across the border in Tindouf, Algeria. UNHCR reports that there are 90,000 refugees from
Western Sahara in Algeria, while the government of Algeria estimates the number to be far
higher, at approximately 165,000. Also, according to UNHCR, there are more than 26,000
refugees from Western Sahara in Mauritania.36 The legal status of these refugees is structured
around an elaborate scheme that the record shows as a long-standing disagreement over heritage
in Western Sahara between the government and an ethnic group.
Vulnerability
On a broader scale, regardless of the region, statelessness is only one factor in vulnerability,
whereas vulnerability is assessed and categorized according to multiple characteristics, as
illustrated in Figure 1. Even so, vulnerability has long been associated with age, health, and the
presence of poverty, and is now combined with the endemic effects of forced migration across
the world. A vulnerability within the context of refugee status and statelessness places children
into multiple descriptive categories across each of the characteristic levels identified in Figure 1.
The categorical placements would presumptively place stateless refugee and forcibly displaced
children in an even higher level of risk and vulnerability that this research stoutly avers warrants
more levels of protection from member states.
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Figure 1. Factors influencing and determining vulnerability (Shilpa Khanna Arora, Dheeraj Shah, Sanjay
Chaturvedi, and Piyush Gupta, “Defining and Measuring Vulnerability in Young People,” Indian Journal of
Community Medicine 40, no. 3 [2015]: 193–197.)

The World Bank’s Orphans and Other Vulnerable Children (OVC) toolkit defines
vulnerability as “the group of children that experience adverse outcomes, such as the loss of their
education, morbidity, and malnutrition, at higher rates than do their peers.” The literal meaning
of “vulnerability” is the state or condition of being weak or poorly defended.37 OVC, as noted in
Figure 1, further explains that the concept of vulnerability with regard to young people implies
the ones who are more exposed to risks than their peers and who can be described as being
deprived of food and parental care and as victims of abuse, neglect, violence, exploitation, and
infection with HIV, which are all characteristics of refugee, stateless, and forced displaced youth.
The Rohingya, Lumad, and Roma already experience vulnerability by holding a stateless
nonrefugee status and being members of a disadvantaged and marginalized group. This
propensity to vulnerability is further heightened by the status as a child, as defined by article 1 of
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child as a person under the age of eighteen.
UNICEF views vulnerable children as those who are abused, exploited, and neglected.
Subsequently, many children and their families seeking self-determination become stateless
nonrefugees and are highly vulnerable to human trafficking and other forms of exploitation,
specifically sexual and labor. For this research, emphasis is placed on the UNICEF categories of
“without registration” and “trafficked children,” because Southeast Asia is the critical-case
7
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geographical focal area. As such, these populations have little to no preventions and protections
afforded to them and become victims of human trafficking and multiple forms of exploitation.

Legal Premise and Relevant Laws
The research reported here offers an innovative new model, the International Law’s Response to
Major Incidents of Forced Displacement (IL-R2/MIFD). The framework lists components
consisting of decision making, applicable international and national laws to circumvent
scenarios, which address human trafficking, smuggling, and multiple forms of exploitation that
occur as a result of massive forced displacement situations across the globe, as well as a
proposed response process. To close the gap in protections for vulnerable populations, this article
offers a state-obliged legal framework.
The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women
and Children (referred to as the Palermo Trafficking Protocol) and the Protocol against the
Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea, and Air list a state’s responsibilities to specific compelled
prevention measures and protection mechanisms for all persons regardless of nationality, gender,
or religion. The major premise of the framework is that article 1 of the protocols affirms that they
supplement the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (referred to
as the Palermo Convention) and that it “shall” be interpreted with the convention, creating a
transnational-obliged requirement. The “shall” denotes the mandatory obligation and, in some
instances, stronger prevention, protection obligation than one-dimensional human rights legal
framework. The Palermo Convention “is the main instrument in the fight against transnational
organized crime.”38 It targets specific areas and manifestations of organized crime: The Protocol
to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children; the
Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea, and Air. . . . Countries must become
parties to the Convention itself before they can become parties to any of the Protocols.
The modern concept of trafficking involves the enticement and the deception elements from
traditional trafficking and exploitations. The Palermo Trafficking Protocol outlines the
requirements for the three most essential policy dimensions of what is referred to as the 3P
index: prevention, protection, and prosecution.39 The Trafficking Protocol requires member
states to formulate domestic legislation that is aligned with article 6—Protection of victims of
trafficking in persons through deterrence and prosecution; article 7—Assist victims of trafficking
in receiving states (highlighting victim rights under transit state obligations); article 8—Provide
repatriation to victims of trafficking in persons, and article 9—Prevention of trafficking in
persons, among other provisions.
An essential element for clarity in this study is the distinguishing difference between the
definitions of human trafficking and smuggling, acknowledging, however, that there is some
overlap. On one hand, migrant smuggling requires movement across the borders of a state,
whereas trafficking does not. On the other hand, smuggling does not include an element of
control, ownership, or exploitation, whereas trafficking does include these elements. Human
trafficking is grounded in slavery and may be prosecuted as enslavement or as sexual slavery by
article 7(1)(c) or 7(1)(g), Crimes against Humanity. Article 7(2)(c) of the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court stipulates the meaning of “enslavement” as a crime against
humanity and explicitly includes trafficking in persons as one of the acts that are incorporated in
the terminology when exercised with “right of ownership over another person,” in particular
women and children.40
8
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Unless noted otherwise, all terms and definitions used in this study are grounded in those
used by the UN and its organs.
Trafficking in persons. The Palermo Trafficking Protocol covers trafficking in persons,
exploitation, and victims. Article 3:
(a) “Trafficking in persons” shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer,
harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of
coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of
vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent
of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation.
Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the or practices similar to slavery, servitude or
the removal of organs;
(b) The consent of a victim of trafficking in persons to the intended exploitation of the
prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services,
slavery exploitation outlined in subparagraph (a) of this article shall be irrelevant where
any of the means outlined in subparagraph (a) have been used;
(c) The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of a child for
exploitation shall be considered “trafficking in persons” even if this does not involve any
of the means outlined in subparagraph (a) of this article;
(d) “Child” shall mean any person under eighteen years of age.
Enslavement. The 1926 Slavery Convention, adopted September 25, 1926 (entered into force
March 9, 1927) states:
Slavery is the status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers
attaching to the right of ownership are exercised.
Smuggling. The Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea, and Air defines
smuggling as
the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material
benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a
national or a permanent resident. (3a)
Crime. For this convention, article 2 states:
(a) “Organized criminal group” shall mean a structured group of three or more persons,
existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or
more serious crimes or offences established in accordance with this Convention, in order
to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit;
(b) “Serious crime” shall mean conduct constituting an offence punishable by a
maximum deprivation of liberty of at least four years or a more serious penalty.
The International Criminal Court’s standing is based on its being the “court of last resort.”
But since the court has jurisdiction only over crimes committed by states parties to its founding
treaty, the Rome Statute, and Myanmar is not a member state, the UN Security Council will have
9
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to intervene. Nevertheless, inquiries abound from advocates at all echelons to prompt a
formidable plan to protect children and their families during forced migrations,41 as a result of
fleeing to achieve self-determination, or as a consequence to being declared stateless in a refugee
or non-refugee status.42 This study seeks to close this protection gap and suggests an action plan
that connects international criminal law and international human rights frameworks to reinforce
and promote better states’ responsibility and obligation.
In that vein, the Palermo Convention and its Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by
Land, Sea, and Air supports the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.43
Consequently, the protection provided by the Law of the Sea extends to human rights with dutybearers inclusive of ship masters, government rescue centers, and every coastal state party. As
such, where relevant, the Law of the Sea applies to each state reviewed in this article and the
entire Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) region. The United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea mandates:
Every State shall require the master of a ship flying its flag, in so far as he can do so
without serious danger to the ship, the crew or the passengers: (a) to render assistance to
any person found at sea in danger of being lost; (b) to proceed with all possible speed to
the rescue of persons in distress, if informed of their need of assistance, in so far as such
action may reasonably be expected of him. (art. 98, para.1)44
Article 98(2) obliges every coastal state party to
promote the establishment, operation and maintenance of an adequate and effective
search and rescue service regarding safety on and over the sea and, where circumstances
so require, by way of mutual regional arrangements co-operate with neighboring States
for this purpose.
The 1979 International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue describes “rescue” a:
[a]n operation to retrieve persons in distress, provide for their initial medical or other
needs, and deliver them to a place of safety. (Annex, chap. 1, 1.3.2)
The convention obliges state parties to
ensure that assistance be provided to any person in distress at sea. They shall do so
regardless of the nationality or status of such a person or the circumstances in which that
person is found. (Annex, chap. 2,2.1.10)45
The elements of the Law of the Sea are usually not synonymous with human rights and
surely not the UN principles of self-determination. It is unconventional to consider using the
Law of the Sea to address prevention and protections for refugees or the stateless. But UNHCR
publications, among many others, highlight the high volume of people risking their lives at sea,
from diverse regions across the world, to “escape persecution, conflict, instability, and poverty”
and the role of the Law of the Sea in human rights is overlooked.46 This research identifies how
the Law of the Sea can be generalized to the case-study group, the Rohingya, as a “vulnerable
population”, who would benefit from the international law. The duty-bearer, the state, has
responsibilities for protection, and what happens to all hopes of self-determination when there is
a critical failure of safeguards. In this example, the Law of the Sea fulfills the protection role,
regardless of nationality.

10
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Bangladesh, Malaysia, Myanmar, and Thailand have not ratified the Refugee and
Statelessness Conventions. But they have ratified the United Nations Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime, one or more of the protocols (Bangladesh has not ratified the
Trafficking Protocol), and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, each of which
is an obliged treaty where a breach is addressed in part 1, chapter 1, articles 1 and 2(a)(b) of the
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 2001 the International Law
Commission articles.47 States are obliged to respond to breaches that have been attributed to their
conduct. Under the scope of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), member states have a venue
for the settlement of international law disputes. The ICJ also renders advisory opinions in
relation to referrals on legal inquiries. Consequently, UN member states are obliged to abide by
the courts decisions where acceptance of the court’s jurisdiction has taken place.
Table 1. Research Target State Ratification

United Nations
Convention
against
Transnational
Organized
Target
Crime (Palermo
Region/Country Convention)

Protocol to
Prevent, Suppress
and Punish
Trafficking in
Persons, Especially
Women and
Children (Palermo
Trafficking
Protocol)

Protocol against the
Smuggling of
Migrants by Land,
Sea, and Air
(Palermo Smuggling
Protocol)

UN Convention on
the Law of the Sea

Bangladesh

July 13, 2011a

Malaysia

September 24,
2004

February 26, 2009a

Myanmar

March 30, 2004a

March 30, 2004a

March 30, 2004a

May 21, 1996a

Thailand

October 17, 2013

October 17, 2013

December 18, 2001s

May 15. 2011 a

July 27,2001
October 14. 1996

Note: a denotes accession; s denotes signed but not ratified or acceded; each state has one or more reservations.

Table 2. Reservations and Declarations: United Nations Convention against Transnational
Organized Crime (Palermo Convention)
Bangladesh
Reservations
Malaysia
Declarations

“In accordance with the provision in paragraph 3 of Article 35 of the
Convention, the People’s Republic of Bangladesh does not consider itself
bound by paragraph 2 of the said Article.”
“(a) Pursuant to Article 35, paragraph 3 of the Convention, the Government of
Malaysia declares that it does not consider itself bound by Article 35,
paragraph 2 of the Convention, and
(b) the Government of Malaysia reserves the right specifically to agree in a
11
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particular case to follow the arbitration procedure set forth in Article 35,
paragraph 2 of the Convention or any other procedure for arbitration.”
Myanmar
Reservations

Thailand
Reservations

“The Government further wishes to make a reservation on Article 35 and does
not consider itself bound by obligations to refer disputes relating to the
interpretation or application of this Convention to the International Court of
Justice.” a
“[I]n accordance with paragraph 3 of Article 35 of the Convention, the
Kingdom of Thailand does not consider itself bound by paragraph 2 of the
same Article.”

a

United Nations; in a communication received September 17, 2012, the government of the Union Myanmar notified
the Secretary-General of the withdrawal of the following reservation made upon accession to the convention: “The
Government of the Union of Myanmar wishes to express reservations on Article 16 relating to extradition and does
not consider itself bound by the same.” Source: UN Treaty Collection,
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-12&chapter=18&clang=_en#10.

Table 3. Reservations and Declarations: Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (Palermo Trafficking Protocol)
supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime
Malaysia
Reservation

Myanmar
Reservation

Thailand
Reservation

“1. (a) Pursuant to Article 15, paragraph 3 of the Protocol, the
Government of Malaysia declares that it does not consider itself bound
by Article 15, paragraph 2 of the Protocol; and
(b) the Government of Malaysia reserves the right specifically to agree
in a particular case to follow the arbitration procedure set forth in Article
15, paragraph 2 of the Protocol or any other procedure for arbitration.”
“The Government of the Union of Myanmar wishes to express
reservation on Article 15 and does not consider itself bound by
obligations to refer disputes relating to the interpretation or application
of this Protocol to the International Court of Justice.”
“[I]n accordance with paragraph 3 of Article 15 of the Protocol, the
Kingdom of Thailand does not consider itself bound by paragraph 2 of
the same Article.”

Note: The protocol was adopted by resolution A/RES/55/25 of November 15, 2000, at the fifty-fifth session of the
General Assembly of the United Nations, entry into force 28 January 28, 2004, in accordance with article 22.

Table 4. The Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea, and Air (Palermo
Smuggling Protocol) (excerpt from the Government of Myanmar)
Myanmar
“The Government of the Union of Myanmar wishes to express
reservation on Article 20 and does not consider itself bound by
obligations to refer disputes relating to the interpretation or application
Reservation
of this Protocol to the International Court of Justice.”
Source: International Law Commission, Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, November 2001,
Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10), chp.IV.E.1, Adopted by the International Law Commission at its fifty-third session (2001). Extract
from the Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its Fifty-third session.
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State Responsibility for an International Wrongful Act
The framework asserts that when the state fails to comply with these treaty-based preventions,
protections for victims, and the prosecution of offenders, it will have breached its international
obligations as outlined in part 1, chapter 1, articles 1, 2(a)(b), and 3 of the Articles on the
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (the ILC articles):
Every international wrongful act of a State entails the international responsibility of that
State. (art. 1)
There is an internationally wrongful act of a State when conduct consisting of an act or
omission:
(a)
is attributable to the State under international law; and
(b)
constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State (art. 2).
The characterization of an act of a State as internationally wrongful is governed by
international law. Such characterization is not affected by the characterization of the
same act as lawful by internal law. (art. 3)

Legal Empowerment and the Principle of the Four Pillars
The director general’s UN 2009 Assembly Report outlines the four pillars of legal
empowerment: access to justice and the rule of law, property rights, labor rights, and business
right.48 This research aligns those pillars with the basis for the UN Charter on SelfDetermination. Embedded in these international laws are components that address the first pillar,
access to justice, the UN Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor defines as, “the use of
legal rights, services, systems, and reform, by and for the disadvantaged populations and often in
combination with other activities, to directly alleviate their poverty, improve their influence on
government actions and services, or otherwise increase their freedom.”49
In states where citizenship has been denied, papers for identity and rights afforded to other
citizens are withheld. But this research asserts that employing state-obliged international
instruments, with the capacity to provide all populations,50 despite domestic legal status,
prevention measures, and protection mechanisms against human trafficking and its multiple
forms of exploitation closes critical gaps left in nonmember states to the Refugee Convention
and the Conventions on Statelessness for the Rohingya, Lumad, and similarly situated groups.
The four pillars provide a guide to the panoramic view of this study, which examines what
works and what does not and why, and seeks to identify and close the gaps needed to help
practitioners and policy makers provide the much-needed prevention, protection, and subsequent
prosecution of the perpetrators who exploit force displaced children and their families, on land
and sea.51

The Rohingya: Case 1, the “Critical Case”
This study delves into the Rohingya situation since 1948 and the international literature that
embraces the legal framework for the protection of stateless children; their legal status under the
law—national and international—and the guarantee of their rights.52 It also looks at the literature
on the Balkan Roma, migrant, and stateless nonrefugee children, who “are more vulnerable than
adult refugees and ordinary citizen children.”53 Unfortunately, citizenship and immigration rights
laws have rendered them stateless. Also, their position as stateless children renders them more
13

New England Journal of Public Policy
susceptible to the danger of being abused, trafficked, smuggled, and treated as illegal immigrants
or criminals.54 As the Southeast Asia territorial rainy monsoon season begins, the United Nations
has expressed concern for pregnant women and children by increasing support.55
The Rohingya are one of Myanmar’s many ethnic minorities and claim ancestry from Arab
traders and other ancient groups from the region of centuries past.56 Like so many other millions,
the Rohingya are caught in the middle of an initially domestic and now international conflict.
Historical data and reports from multiple media sources and the United Nations indicate that
Myanmar’s government denies citizenship to the Rohingya and, in keeping with the dominant
“public” attitude, views them as illegal immigrants from Bangladesh.57 In recent years, according
to UNHCR estimates, more than a hundred thousand Rohingya have been displaced or have been
subject to extreme violence, brutality, and exploitation. Matthew Smith of CNN, like many other
journalists, depicts the Rohingyas as, “amongst the world’s least wanted” and “one of the
world’s most persecuted minorities.”58
The Rohingya have documented denial of self-determination and human rights and other
freedoms, and since 2016, they have been subject to forced displacement. The Rohingya are
particularly vulnerable to all forms of violence and the many forms of exploitation covered under
the Palermo Convention and the Palermo Trafficking and Smuggling Protocols.59 The underlying
premise of the Palermo Protocol is that without a nationality, stateless people, especially
children, often face severe obstacles and barriers that prohibit access to education, employment,
healthcare, legal remedies, freedom of movement, and other fundamental citizenry rights.
UNHCR chronicled the events of the Rohingya for a hundred days as a reflection of the hundreds
of years of struggle. A timeline of the Rohingya crisis that appears on the Internet
(https://reliefweb.int/report/bangladesh/100-days-horror-and-hope-timeline-rohingya-crisis)
depicts an international community scrambling to address what has generally been described as a
humanitarian nightmare by a comprehensive and broad level of international leadership.
The loss of human life and severe human suffering among the Rohingya in 2016 and 2017
led to comparisons of their treatment to crimes against humanity. Lurid images of suffering
children engulfed in inhabitable living conditions fleeing Myanmar’s domestic and now
international conflicts across the border to Bangladesh and other countries have become a
worldwide matter. The claims of “atrocity crimes” committed against the Rohingya is supported
by the UNHCR, Zeid Ra’ ad al-Hussein, and others, who have called the exodus of the Rohingya
“a textbook example of ethnic cleansing.” The term “atrocity crimes” identifies three legally
defined international crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. The crimes are
defined in the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the
1949 Geneva Conventions and their 1977 Additional Protocols, and the 1998 Rome Statute.
Referring to the UN Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect, the
UN Commission of Experts developed two reports to address the violations of international
humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia as a point of reference:
Interim Report S/25274, which defines ethnic cleaning as “rendering an area ethnically
homogeneous by using force or intimidation to remove persons of given groups from the area,”
and Final Report S/1994/674, which describes ethnic cleansing as “a purposeful policy designed
by one ethnic or religious group to remove by violent and terror-inspiring means the civilian
population of another ethnic or religious group from certain geographic areas.”
The UN Commission of Experts describe the practices as “constituting crimes against
humanity [that] can be assimilated to specific war crimes.” The UN experts add that the acts are
within the realm of the Genocide Convention and therefore amount to breaches of international
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humanitarian law. In the early 1990s, odious imagery was not as quickly broadcast and delivered
in real time as it is now because of technological advancements in communication. Now, in
contrast to the limited and delayed reporting from a small corner of the world in Africa and
Yugoslavia in 1993–1994, media broadcasts are wide-reaching and in real time, and these reports
have inspired outcries and demands across the globe for immediate action from the United
Nations, the International Criminal Court, and other international bodies.

The Lumad: Case 2
Like the Rohingya, the Lumad are an indigenous people with historical roots that extend back
centuries. The Lumad are located in Mindanao, Philippines, and comprise an estimated eighteen
major ethnolinguistic groups. In 2008, the Institute for War and Peace published a controversial
document, a memorandum of agreement on ancestral domain (MOA-AD). The originators of the
MOA-AD announced that they intended to bring peace to the region and form the Bangsamoro
Juridical Entity (BJE) as a substate led by the local Muslim community in Mindanao.60
Indigenous groups assert, however, that the BJE is a pretext to evict them from their native lands
and interfere in their religious beliefs and their social and cultural systems.
Conflict reignited between Muslim separatist groups, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, and
government troops after the Lumad authorities refused to sign the MOA-AD. Since neither the
Philippines nor Malaysia has ratified the UN Convention on Refugees or the UN Convetions on
Statelessness, the most prudent international prevention and protection measures are the
provisions of the Palermo Convention, articles 6, 7, and 8.
Whereas no leader has come forward among the Rohingya to intervene and optimize tools of
legal empowerment in their dispute over ancestral lands and nationality rights, the Lumad tribal
chief, Timuay Nanding Mudai, led a successful self-determination rights rebuttal. In response,
the Manila Supreme Court ordered a temporary restraining order shortly before a scheduled
signing in Malaysia. In this instance, again unlike what occurred among the Rohingya, the tribal
chief was joined in opposition of the BJE by more than two hundred other ethnic leaders
representing indigenous groups in the provinces of Palawan and Mindanao.
The Lumad objected to their lack of involvement in the document’s origination; specifically,
the elements covered a majority of the Subanen, which has been a Lumad tribal ancestral home.
Also, the areas in dispute included Zamboanga del Sur and Zamboanga del Norte, both in the
Western Mindanao region. The leaders defended their home rights in the Cagayan de Oro
Declaration of August 27, 2008. One of the few legal documents that have declared rights for
migrants, the document states: “We assert that Mindanao is not only inhabited by the
Bangsamoro people, but also by indigenous peoples and ‘migrant’ settlers.”

The Roma: Case 3
The Roma live primarily in Eastern Europe, which was formerly Communist bloc countries.
Linguistic research indicates that different groups of Romany people originated in India, though
the groups left sometime before the tenth century. The Romany people eventually arrived in
most sections of Europe by the Middle Ages with further migration in Europe between 1000 and
1025.61 The special rapporteur on minority issues, Rita Izsák, reports that the Roma have made
substantial contributions to seasonal labor and services that others in the community were unable
or unwilling to execute.62 Nonetheless, the Roma remain without rights to land that they have
occupied for centuries.
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Collectively, the group refers to themselves as Roma; the adjectival form is Romani or
Romany, which also refers to their spoken language. This terminology can cause confusion by
giving the false impression that they are from Romania. The Roma have experienced
discrimination based on the premise that they are “dirty” or “criminal.” This discrimination has
led to a collapsed opportunity for stable employment among Roma seeking traditional
employment in factories and shops and in the other professions. It has also resulted in the
“traditional” Romany’s gaps in education and the resulting fulfillment of jobs described by
Fraser as “tinkering, dealing scrap metal, farm labor, bear training, and circus entertainment.”63
This lack of rights—a status of statelessness—is mainly associated with cultural or societal
discrimination. The Roma’s isolation and the negative stereotypes about them are largely based
on the real or perceived notion that they are migratory and their lack of citizenship. The Roma
have found themselves in a cyclical trap that has passed down through the generations. Like their
parents, who were denied opportunities, the new generation will be unable to move forward
without education and training.

Discussion
The analytical framework of this study examines the substantive international instruments
relating to human rights and state obligations, focusing on international criminal law with respect
to human trafficking; smuggling; exploitation of children on land, in territorial waters, and on the
high seas, that is, in international waters; and rights due all children, despite nationality and
religious background.
The research investigation seeks to establish a causal relationship or link implied by the
chosen theory and critical-case example to derive conclusions that support the Rohingya children
and other children in similar situations across the globe in an effort to provide a more
comprehensive and thorough analysis of what the global and regional stateless nonrefugee child
exploitation data shows as a gap in prevention and protection measures for those seeking selfdetermination.
The study coincides with the charter presented by the UN Special Rapporteur on Antitrafficking’s application of the Palermo Convention and the Palermo Trafficking and Smuggling
Protocols in its broader scope and its cross-section with the fabric of human rights law.
Statelessness can be viewed through several lenses.64 This research argues that repurposing the
administration of the Palermo Convention and the Palermo Trafficking and Smuggling Protocols
within a member state’s legal framework will prompt the states’ duty to protect the stateless.
Repurposing the law presents an opportunity to position it as a primary conduit to support human
rights instruments for the disadvantaged and marginalized populations before, during, and after
forced migration. The research strengthens the debate that compliance or failure to comply with
the Palermo Convention prompts a transnational consequence that collaterally affects another
country and obliges the member state to put in place prevention measures and protection
mechanisms for stateless nonrefugee, disadvantaged, and marginalized groups of children
seeking self-determination.
Optimizing the administration of the Palermo Convention and its protocols opens up global
resources to help address the many safety needs of targeted populations. Moreover, the Palermo
Convention and the revised administration set forth in the protocols can serve as a buttress to
member states committed to the United Nations Convention for the Rights of the Child. The
international law closes the gap and addresses the humanitarian needs of stateless nonrefugees
and the forced displaced in the vast number of nonmember states that provide the authoritative
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definition: the 1954 and 1961 UN Conventions on Statelessness and the 1951 UN Refugee
Convention.
State Treaty Obligation
The argument that member states have an obligation under the Palermo Convention rests heavily
on international law. The most formal and reliable form of international commitment is the
treaty.65 Treaties provide multiple advantages in addition to signaling a high level of
commitment. They represent clear and well-defined obligations of states; they can provide for
explicit dispute resolution, through treaties such as the North America Free Trade Association,
and define rules for accession and exit.66 Member states are obliged to conduct themselves in
accordance with the international law provided in article 38 of the 1946 Statute of the
International Court of Justice as “evidence of a general practice accepted as law.”67 As the two
requisite elements for determining whether a legal norm has been acquired within the respective
member states’ customary status, state practice and opinio juris are examined through the case
law, law reports, and international practices.
To optimize protection of the stateless, research requires the unfolding of the phenomena.
The process includes vulnerability mapping and a review of systematic and targeted preventions
under the Palermo Trafficking and Smuggling Protocols. State treaty responsibilities, under the
provisions of the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 2001
(ILC Articles), oblige support to the concepts of legal empowerment and self-determination.68
The support comes in the form of an obliged state responsibility to the international community
to include those without nationality or those discriminated against.
Myanmar
The Republic of the Union of Myanmar, previously referred to as Burma, is a sovereign state in
Southeast Asia bordered by Bangladesh, China, India, Laos, and Thailand.69 Its longstanding
political unrest has significantly hindered its position on humanitarian protections. Azeem
Ibrahim’s research attests that since Burma became independent in 1948, the country’s
leadership and political forces have been targeting the Rohingya and calling for their expulsion
from their homeland. Ibrahim and other historians depict the region as closed and detached from
the international scrutiny. The region has an extensive and complex history. Even under British
rule, the descriptor used for the Rohingya was “ugly as ogres,” lacking the “fair and soft skin” of
other Burmese ethnic groups.70
Though the British Commonwealth ruled the country until 1948, Burma claimed democracy
until 1962 and transitioned to military rule from 1962 to 2011. Burmese leadership met with the
then U.S. secretary of state Hillary Clinton in November 2011 and British prime minister David
Cameron shortly after that. Other dignitary visits soon followed with Tony Blair, EU
Commission president Jośe Manuel Barroso, and President Barrack Obama in 2012.71 Despite a
series of events involving the ASEAN leadership in 2014, sanctions, and embargoes, no changes
toward citizenry for the Rohingyas or their treatment have emerged.
Notwithstanding Myanmar’s nonparty status to the Rome Statute, on April 9, 2018, Judge
Antoine Kesia-Mbe Mindua, under regulation 46(3), presided over the prosecution’s request for
a ruling on jurisdiction under article 19(3) of the statute over the objections of Myanmar. The
following segment of the pretrial hearing explains the justification:
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The coercive acts relevant to the deportations occurred on the territory of a State, which
is not a party to the Rome Statute (Myanmar). However, the Prosecution considers that
the Court may nonetheless exercise jurisdiction under article 12(2)(a) of the Statute
because an essential legal element of the crime—crossing an international border—
occurred on the territory of a State which is a party to the Rome Statute (Bangladesh).72
A significant component of the prosecutor’s submissions states:
The Prosecution seeks a ruling on the Court’s jurisdiction under article 12(2)(a)—
specifically, to verify that the Court has territorial jurisdiction when persons are deported
from the territory of a State which is not a party to the Statute directly into the territory of
a State which is a party to the Statute.73
The international world anxiously awaited the outcome of article 19(3) of the statute, which
was decided by majority approval. Shortly afterward, September 18, 2018, the prosecutor
announced the formal opening of the preliminary examination investigation to exercise
jurisdiction over “the alleged deportation of the Rohingya people from Myanmar occurred on the
territory of Myanmar (which is a State not party to the Statute) to Bangladesh (which is a State
party to the Statute).”74 On July 4 2019, the prosecutor authorized an investigation into the list of
alleged crimes that covers the period since October 9, 2016.
Target Region Challenges
Several countries have reformed their gender discriminatory nationality laws or initiated new
ones in the past fifteen years. Nepal, Brunei Darussalam, and Malaysia, however, prohibit
mothers the ability to convey nationality to their children.75 Beyond national laws, there remain
many practices in rural communities that further perpetuate women’s inequality issues, including
laws against their owning property and the “bride price” for girls sold into marriage.
The focal area, depicted in Figure 2, including Myanmar, Bangladesh, Thailand, the
Philippines, and Malaysia, continues to be plagued with gender equality challenges and has been
labeled by UNHCR as the highest stateless population in the world.76 Figure 2 illustrates how
tightly clustered these countries are, that they share multiple borders, and that they are situated
near territorial and international waters. The U.S. State Department’s 2017 Trafficking Victims
Protection Act (TVPA) ranks countries on a four-tier scale according to their record of meeting
the TVPA’s minimum standards. The Tier 2 Watch List, for example, includes the governments
of countries that do not fully meet the TVPA’s minimum standards but are making significant
efforts to bring themselves into compliance with those standards, and for which:
a. the absolute number of victims of severe forms of trafficking is very significant or is
significantly increasing;
b. there is a failure to provide evidence of increasing efforts to combat severe forms of
trafficking in persons from the previous year; or
c. the determination that a country is making significant efforts to bring itself into
compliance with minimum standards was based on commitments by the country to take
additional steps over the next year.77
Though these countries do not fully meet the TVPA minimum requirements, they all have either
ratified or accepted by acceding, with reservations, one or more of the following: the Palermo
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Convention, the Palermo Trafficking Protocol, and the Palermo Smuggling Protocol, as shown
earlier in Tables 1–3.

Figure 2. Southeast Asia, research regional geographical focus
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Proposed Intervening Response Plan
The Palermo Trafficking Protocol, supplementing the Palermo Convention, is the basis for the
formulation of a generalizable and replicable international law framework. The Palermo
Convention is an international law and its domestic integration mandated into legislation allows
this research to proffer a practitioner’s model of practice for the prevention, protection measures,
and mechanisms to mitigate and possibly circumvent human trafficking, smuggling, and
exploitation of forced displaced children, IL-R2/MIFD, to describe the components of decision
making and legal frameworks used in conjunction with a computer-based app, serving as a etoolkit.78
Briefly stated, IL-R2/MIFD mimics the model established by the medical industry. The
medical industry, across the globe, has established uniformity for handling major incidents. With
little resistance, the World Health Organization and an international team of health care
professionals spring into action in response to major medical incidents, such as an outbreak of
cholera. In such instances, there is usually minimal differentiation between the nationalities of
the medical resource personnel. Instead, the attention is focused on providing a universal level of
care, regardless of the geographical area to be addressed. There are issues and concerns where
conflicts, domestic or international, are involved. But reports indicate that most efforts are
successful in providing critical medical preventive care and emergent care.
Moreover, in medical care, major incidents are delineated by origin, such as whether they
are natural or man-made. Correspondingly, in issues involving refugees, UNHCR provides the
authoritative definition of internally displaced persons (IDPs), as
persons or groups of persons, who have been forced or obliged to flee or leave their
homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the
effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights,
or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally
recognized state border.79
The model of practice e-toolkit, due for publication in 2021, outlines the fundamental steps of
the IL-R2/MIFD, a logic-based process, where legal practitioners and advocates respond to and
deploy to forced displaced scenarios as a preventive and protective measure in much the same
way medical providers respond to major medical incidents. The model of practice e-toolkit
provides a uniform scenario of IL-R2/MIFD responses that includes addressing the three types of
displacement related to statelessness: displacement as a cause of statelessness, displacement as a
consequence of statelessness, and statelessness as a challenge in the displacement context (an
obstacle or barrier to the resolution of refugee problems).80 The responses are not exhaustively
listed within this brief summary. But the IL-R2/MIFD e-toolkit optimizes the elements of the
Palermo Trafficking Protocol’s prevention and protection elements of the 3P index, while
providing information to individuals who are highly susceptible to human trafficking and other
forms of exploitation. This new platform is innovative and much needed to address the many
vulnerable populations seeking self-determination who still fall prey to perpetrators of human
trafficking, smuggling, and exploitation, whether individuals or enterprises. This research posits
that by employing the IL-R2/MIFD and optimizing the use of the Palermo Trafficking and
Smuggling Protocols, supplemented by the Palermo Convention in member states, international
teams can mitigate the harm done to vulnerable individuals seeking self-determination who are
exposed to exploitation during forced migration situations.
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